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Abstract 
Recent academic studies have shown that since the mid-nineties, 
the pass-through of exogenous oil shocks into headline inflation 
has been increasing while the pass through into core inflation 
seems to have ceased. This paper explores the implications in 
terms of commodity allocation for inflation hedging portfolios 
these recent works have paved the way for. We proceed by first 
evidencing a link between the headline to core inflation spread 
and tradable commodities. We subsequently intend to exploit 
this link in two ways: firstly by devising an efficient strategic 
allocation using core inflation forecasts to determine the 
commodities’ natural weight in the portfolio as dictated by our 
macro approach. And secondly by testing a tactical allocation 
strategy which would time the pass-through cycle to 
dynamically determine the optimal share of commodities in the 
allocation.  
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Introduction 
 
The intricate relationship between crude oil prices and macroeconomic variables, 
inflation in particular, has been extensively studied in the last decade. Following the seminal 
work of (Blanchard & Gali, 2007), it has been commonly accepted that the pass-through of 
exogenous oil price shocks to output and inflation has greatly diminished since the nineties, 
thereby severely reducing their role as drivers of long-term inflation and economic crisis. 
Moreover, (Clark & Terry, 2010) and (van den Noord & André, 2007) have shown that the 
transmission of oil price shocks into core inflation has now basically ceased, thereby greatly 
differentiating the behavior of core and headline inflation. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, 
no research paper has focused precisely on the implications in terms of commodity allocation 
for inflation hedging portfolio management that this macroeconomic shift implies. 
 The question of the optimal allocation of commodities in an inflation hedging portfolio 
has been central to academic research since the end of the era of cheap oil in the seventies in 
the United States. The first article directly addressing this issue was (Bodie & Rosansky, 
1980) which advocates the inclusion of commodities as natural inflation hedges. Commodities 
can be included in a standard portfolio optimization framework for two main reasons: firstly, 
commodities have offered potentially strong nominal returns and are a source of performance 
enhancement on a risk-adjusted basis as they are potentially decorrelated from other standard 
asset classes. Secondly, commodities seem to offer interesting inflation hedging properties. 
Yet, commodities are cyclical and can suffer from very sharp downturns, of magnitudes that 
greatly dwarf inflation variations, thus rendering their inclusion into inflation hedging 
portfolios non-trivial. 
 The mainstream of academic literature over recent decades has been made up of 
response function analysis following the seminal work of (Campbell & Viceira, 2002) which 
introduced the use of structural Vector Autoregressive Models (VAR) allowing the 
computation of response functions to inflationary shocks, regime change or more complex 
scenarios in the case of Markov Switching models. It has recently expanded into the co-
integration universe with the use of Vector Error Correction Models (Amenc, Martellini, & 
Ziemann, 2009). Though such works may offer some interesting insights, their statistical 
significance is quite weak and their out of sample efficiency remains to be proved: using a 
VAR or a VECM as a quantitative allocation method requires the estimation of a high 
dimensional model which parameters’ calibration can only achieve statistical significance on 
very long datasets since it is generally performed on low frequency quarterly data. It becomes 
problematic when the required historical depth is compared to the frequency of 
macroeconomic regime changes: the persistence in the determination of the model’s 
parameters might thus fail to reflect regime changes in a timely manner, thereby also 
impeding tactical uses of the model. In fact, such models do not try to exploit dynamically the 
relationship between commodity price shocks and inflation but rather tend to measure the 
potential unexpected inflation-hedging resilience of an asset class in a static allocation, were 
such an event to occur. 
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 Since no publicly available, global macro approach using the pass-through literature to 
allocate commodities has been proposed, we investigate this issue in this article: we will 
attempt to define a natural commodity allocation derived from their expected contribution to 
headline inflation trends using forward core values as an allocation metric. The first section of 
the article will be dedicated to a review of the literature concerning changes in the pass-
through, its measurement and commodity allocation research. The second section will 
investigate the impacts of this shift into financial securities’ pricing and correlation structure, 
then propose strategies aimed at exploiting them. Finally, the last section will evaluate two 
possible exploitations of our findings: a strategic allocation framework and a dynamic tactical 
allocation framework.  
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1. Shifting paradigm, vanishing pass-through and allocation issues 
1.1. The macroeconomic literature of the shifting paradigm 
One of the great macroeconomic paradigms of the twentieth century was that exogenous 
oil shocks were harbingers of macroeconomic chaos in the form of surging inflation, 
restrictive monetary policies and severe drop in output. Collective memories of the two major 
oil shocks in the seventies largely fed into this. However, a recent stream of literature has 
challenged this assumption on the basis of new evidence pointing to a much reduced role for 
oil price shocks in terms of being a generator of macroeconomic volatility. The seminal article 
of (Blanchard & Gali, 2007) completes this literature by trying to measure and explain the 
diminishing macroeconomic impact of oil shocks since the eighties as compared to the 
seventies. Using a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model, they estimate impulse 
response functions (IRF) to exogenous oil price shocks. Their rolling timeframe estimation 
results point at a clear reduction in the impact of shocks since the mid-eighties. In a later 
paper, (Blanchard & Riggi, 2009) estimated a simpler new-Keynesian model derived from 
these observations aiming at explaining the causes of the shift. The authors evaluate and 
model three possible explanations found in the literature: a reduction in the energy intensity of 
output, a relaxation of the real wage rigidity or the effectiveness of new central bank 
monetary policies. These hypotheses can in turn be explained by their respective literature: 
The decline in energy intensity of US output measured by (Wing, 2008) could be the result of 
both intra-industries’ energy efficiency improvement and inter-industries’ sectorial 
reorientation of productive capacities toward less energy intensive ones such as services. 
The vanishing real wage rigidity is documented in (Card & Hyslop, 1997) which showed that 
between the seventies and the eighties, an increasing number of employees were not receiving 
inflation neutralizing raises, therefore upholding the belief that inflation “greases the wheels 
of the labor market” by eroding in time the downward nominal wage rigidity. 
The increased effectiveness of central bank monetary policies has been largely attributed to 
the successes of inflation targeting monetary policies introduced in the early nineties. By also 
using an SVAR to calibrate a general equilibrium model, (Boivin & Giannoni, 2006) have 
shown that compared to the eighties, monetary policy exogenous shocks seem to have a much 
lesser impact in terms of volatility of inflation and output. Also, the reduced size and 
increased frequency of monetary shocks seem to point to a more proactive and efficient policy 
response. All of these elements tend to demonstrate an enhanced credibility of central banks at 
achieving price stability. 
  The most interesting aspect of this macro-shift for our purpose can be found in the first 
of Blanchard’s papers cited (Blanchard & Riggi, 2009). The authors note that by comparing 
the results obtained over the twenty years or so before and after 1980, the contribution of oil 
shocks to economic fluctuations remained flat for GDP and employment, declined by half for 
wage inflation and the GDP deflator while it increased by almost a half for CPI inflation. But 
most importantly, these observations are consistent with the core CPI remaining stable as oil 
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price shocks are passed on to the energy component of the CPI and, according to their 
estimate, account for up to sixty percent of its volatility. This brings us to our second point: 
the vanishing pass-through of energy price shocks from headline to core prices. 
 
1.2. The vanishing pass-through 
Exogenous oil shocks are, by conventional wisdom, the main drivers of CPI inflation: 
this passage of changes in the prices of energy to the general price level in the economy as 
measured by the CPI has been dubbed the inflation pass-through of energy prices. While it 
was indisputably fairly large until the late seventies, it is then quite amusing as (Hooker, 
1999) noted that the very nature of this close relationship broke down at the very moment 
when (Hamilton, 1983) published his landmark paper on the link between oil prices and 
macroeconomic variables. 
There is an extensive body of literature that delves into this vanishing pass-through and 
provides a variety of possible explanations and ways to measure it: (De Gregorio, 
Landerretche, & Neilson, 2007) extend the (Blanchard & Gali, 2007) paper by incorporating a 
much larger set of 34 countries, including emerging ones and estimate the pass-through using 
IRFs derived from an SVAR analysis and an enhanced Philips curve with oil parameters. 
They conclude that it has fallen significantly since the mid-seventies for all developed 
countries and, to a smaller extent, in emerging markets. This reduction has been the result of 
both a decline in the economic intensity of oil use and the impact of favorable exchange rates 
as the latest oil shock has been demand-driven (therefore resulting in an appreciation of 
exporting countries’ currencies). Both of these new arguments still fail to explain a significant 
part of the reduction of the pass-through as the authors conclude. Using an equivalent 
methodology, (Chen, 2009) points out the degree of trade openness as the only statistically 
significant additional explanatory variable included in his analysis, but still fails to explain a 
large part of the pass-through decline. 
The other interesting aspect of this pass-through is the transmission of energy price 
variations from headline to core inflation. The oil-inflation paradigm previously exposed 
would have those variations reflected immediately in headline CPI and then progressively 
transferred into core CPI measures as economic agents gradually adapt their prices to a 
change in energy input prices. This transmission mechanism would end-up closing the gap 
between both indicators. In essence, it would be a headline to core inflation pass-through. In 
fact, core CPI measures are often disregarded by financial professionals as merely lagged 
estimates of headline CPI. But as all paradigms seem doomed to fail, (van den Noord & 
André, 2007) showed that during the recent crisis, core inflation’s reaction to headline spikes 
remained totally muted in both the US and Europe. Once again, the reduction in energy 
intensity is identified as the main explanation of this, but so is the fact that this recent crisis 
occurred at a time of economic slack compared to previous ones in the seventies in particular. 
(Clark & Terry, 2010) went down this path using a more complex time-varying-parameters 
and stochastic-volatility-Bayesian-VAR methodology to precisely estimate the pass-through 
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of energy price variations to core inflation in the US. They estimate that since approximately 
1975, core CPI in the US had gradually become less responsive to changes in energy prices. 
By 1985, the pass-through had been reduced to nil. 
 
1.3. The case for a commodity allocation in asset liability management 
Commodities have been exchanged in spot and futures format since immemorial times 
and were most certainly the subject of the first derivative trades. Yet, they have only recently 
attracted the attention of portfolio managers as a strategic investment class. In fact, the first 
meaningful articles on the issue of incorporating commodities into an investment portfolio are 
contemporaneous with the first major oil shocks since the Second World War and the surging 
inflation that accompanied them. Back then, they had already been studied in conjunction 
with inflation: in the early eighties, (Greer, 1978), (Bodie & Rosansky, 1980) and (Bodie Z. , 
1983) explore their inflation hedging potential. Since then, the number of articles exploring 
the potential of commodities as an alternative asset class both for performance enhancement 
and liability management is simply astonishing. Commodities’ impressively long bull run in 
the previous decade certainly helped as the contrarians showed (Daskalaki & Skiadopoulos, 
2011) in their out of sample analysis. 
The benefits of a commodity allocation are usually described as investing in an asset 
class with equity-like returns and low correlation with traditional equity-bond-cash portfolios 
(Conover M. C., Jensen, Johnson, & Mercer, 2010). The question of the correlation of this 
specific asset class to other more conventional ones has been studied in depth by (Chong & 
Miffre, 2010). However, it is regrettable that linkers were excluded from this analysis even 
though there is an obvious historical depth availability issue. More specifically, the potential 
of commodities to hedge against unexpected inflation has been explored in (Attié & Roache, 
2009) even though (Erb & Harvey, 2006) note that a specific distinction should be made 
between commodities as a whole and commodity indices which experience a fairly different 
kind of return and correlation profile. After the energy component, the second most studied 
commodity sub-index has been precious metals which also exhibit interesting inflation 
hedging potential in times of severe downturn and  “flight to safety” phenomenon (Conover 
C. M., Jensen, Johnson, & Mercer, 2009). Lastly, the tactical value of commodities in a 
general portfolio optimization framework was shown in (Fuertes, Miffre, & Rallis, 2010) to 
name just one of the many articles on this subject. 
The inflation hedging potential of commodities has fueled research into their inclusion 
in liability driven investment strategies. (Hoevenaars, Molenaarb, Schotman, & Steenkamp, 
2008) justify their inclusion in a simulated Asset Liability Management (ALM) analysis for 
both their risk diversification benefits and their inflation hedging capacities. The same is true 
for the long only investment approach of (Amenc, Martellini, & Ziemann, 2009) and (Brière 
& Signori, 2010). However, all these papers ignore the inflation pass-through macro aspect of 
the allocation. This type of approach combining a liability (a.k.a. an inflation risk) and a 
8 
 
macroec
of the co
To
implicat
inflation
Roache,
after wh
through
mention
versus h
 
2.
2.
 A
assessed
headline
used US
Saint L
Consum
with its
Items” 
Return 
inflation
hereafte
Figure 1
  
onomic tac
mmodity a
 the best o
ions of th
 hedged po
 2009), com
ich their he
 of commo
ed academ
eadline inf
 Finan
1. Histor
 first impre
 by calcul
 inflation, 
 core infla
ouis Feder
ers, All Ite
 headline 
(CPIAUCN
Commodity
 as the ben
r are index
: Rolling time
tical alloca
llocation o
f our know
e commodi
rtfolios. Y
modities d
dging pote
dity price i
ic research
lation cycle
cial asset
ic correlat
ssion of th
ating the c
core inflati
tion as me
al Reserve
ms Less F
counterpart
S). Investa
 Index (G
chmark m
ed on unadj
 frame corre
tion can b
f (Jensen, J
ledge, no 
ties-to-infla
et, if we ar
o offer a re
ntial seems
nflation to 
 into the p
s as an indi
 conseque
ions and v
e impact o
orrelation 
on and the
asured by t
 in the fo
ood & Ene
, the “Con
ble commo
SCI-TR). W
ade of US 
usted CPI r
lation analy
e found for
ohnson, & 
research h
tion pass-
e to believ
latively go
 to graduall
core prices
ass-through
cator for th
nces of t
olatility an
f the pass
between a 
 difference
he Bureau 
rm of the 
rgy, Not S
sumer Pric
dities wer
e chose 
Treasury In
eferences.
sis between c
 example i
Mercer, 200
as focused
through pre
e (Brière &
od inflation
y wane. Co
? Consideri
, could we
e timing of
he shiftin
alysis 
-through in
commodity
 between th
of Labor S
“Consume
easonally 
e Index fo
e modeled 
to use sea
flation Pro
ommodities a
n the long-
2). 
specificall
viously ex
 Signori, 2
 hedge up t
uld this be 
ng for exam
 envisage l
 the allocati
g macro-
 terms of a
 index on 
e two on t
tatistics an
r Price Ind
Adjusted” (
r All Urba
by the Go
sonally un
tected Sec
nd inflation 
short macr
y on the al
posed in t
010) and (
o a certain 
a result of t
ple the pr
ooking at 
on? 
structure
sset prices
the one h
he other h
d publishe
ex for Al
CPILFENS
n Consum
ldman Sac
adjusted se
urities (TIP
indices 
 
o-timing 
location 
erms of 
Attié & 
horizon, 
he pass-
eviously 
the core 
 
 can be 
and and 
and. We 
d by the 
l Urban 
) along 
ers: All 
hs Total 
ries for 
S) used 
9 
 
We plotted in Figure 1 those three measures for quarterly data over the 1975-2010 
period using a 20-quarter rolling time frame and using the GSCI-TR. From this first rough 
insight, we can grasp that the correlation between the commodity index and core inflation 
(dark blue dashed line) is on average quite low and unstable through time. The correlation 
between headline inflation and the commodity index (grey pointed line) is also unstable but 
secularly increasing over times, even though it is subject to brutal regime changes in terms of 
correlation levels. We can speculate that they appear to be synchronous with severe macro or 
oil specific events (or both) such as the 1985-86 counter oil shock (Mabro, 1987) or the US 
1992 recession (Hamilton, 2011). The correlation between the commodity index and the 
volatile fraction of the inflation index a.k.a. the headline vs. core spread (solid light blue line) 
has more or less been continuously rising since the mid-eighties and has risen above 80% in 
recent years.  Its trend has been so closely linked to its headline counterpart that it has even 
gone up to the point of being indistinguishable from it in the last ten years. 
Consistently with prior literature, our computation exhibits a new correlation regime 
that began in the nineties: core inflation appears weakly correlated with commodities but is 
somewhat upward trending. Headline inflation’s correlation with commodities appears very 
strong and its evolution has been matched by the correlation between the inflation spread and 
commodities. But how will it evolve going forward? Is it a transient state as a result of the 
current market turmoil or is it a stable long term-trend? The last subsections will delve into 
this issue with a co-integration analysis to try to answer this point. The previously exposed 
literature gave an economic explanation for the link between spot oil prices and headline 
inflation or for the absence of it when it comes to core inflation and our simple correlation 
analysis does seem to support an investment strategy. We will therefore explore the 
possibilities in terms of inflation hedging strategies that this new framework enables in the 
next subsection. 
Table 1: CI vs. HI quarterly volatility reduction. 
 
Consistently with, and in addition to, the previously exposed correlation arguments, we 
can measure a shift in terms of absolute volatility levels: while the ratio between the HI and 
the CI volatility used to be minimal at times when the headline-to-core inflation pass-through 
was high (-13%), it widened dramatically after the pass-through ceased to operate (-58%). 
Also, the average difference between both indices which used to be completely insignificant 
at 1 bp per annum increased to around 10 bp per annum, which is still fairly small. 
 
Mean Std. HI CI
1970‐2010 0.02% 2.15% 3.40% 2.75% ‐19.15%
1970‐1990 0.01% 1.86% 3.22% 2.78% ‐13.49%
1990‐2010 0.03% 2.39% 2.91% 1.70% ‐41.82%
2000‐2010 0.10% 3.15% 3.79% 1.58% ‐58.25%
Timeframe
Δ(HI,CI) Volatility Volatility 
Reduction 
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minus-CI correlation with commodities should remain high and stable throughout the cycle. If 
our objective is primarily an inflation hedge, then we should calibrate a strategic commodity 
allocation to correspond to the forecasted residual spread between the CI and the HI. 
Therefore, to make the better use of the informational content of our two inflation 
indices in order to enhance the commodity allocation of our inflation protected portfolio: if 
the pass-through does operate, we should adopt a tactical allocation technique, whereas if it 
doesn’t, we should use a strategic allocation approach. We shall evaluate those two options 
separately in the next sections. 
In accordance with our prior hypothesis, we compute the CH indicator as the integrated 
difference between the quarterly spread between the CI and the HI. We obtain Figure 3 by 
superimposing with a different axis the contemporaneous evolution of the CH indicator (light 
blue continuous line) and the GSCI_TR index (dark blue dashed line). We also separately 
represented the GSCI_TR prior to the inclusion of energy commodities in December 1982 
when their liquidity was deemed sufficient (light grey dashed line). 
Figure 3: A Comparison of the GSCI TR index and the CH Indicator 
 
As could have been expected from the correlation analysis, there seems to be no clear 
relation between those two time series up until the late nineties, when there are clear hints of 
co-movements, if not of an outright cointegration relationship. In fact, considering the 
methodology employed by the statistical body on the one hand, and the computation of the 
commodity index, it is not initially obvious that such a relationship could hold. We are de 
facto comparing a consumer price derived index to a financial market derivative transaction 
based index, both of which could easily answer to very different drivers: the GSCI_TR could 
be very sensitive to market manipulation or short-term adjustments, whereas the other index 
would not as a result of sticky prices in non-financial markets. This kind of argument could 
also offer a tentative alternative explanation for the weak relationship earlier on in the period: 
at this moment in time, commodities financial markets were much less developed, more 
‐2 500
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illiquid and trading costs were extremely high. Such events would put a serious drag on the 
returns of the GSCI_TR during much of the seventies and eighties whereas the consumer 
price index obviously remained untouched by such market-trading considerations. 
 
2.3. Cointegration analysis as a predictor of long-term trends 
As any investor knows or should know, “past performance is no guarantee of future 
results”. And indeed, even though we have constructed an indicator designed to exhibit strong 
historic empirical correlation with commodities in the current macro-financial environment, 
we have not provided any indisputable proof that would ensure the persistence of the 
correlation through time. And there is clearly none because that would be equivalent to 
assuming that the headline-to-core inflation pass-through will remain muted forever. Still, we 
could partially reinforce our econometric assumptions by running a cointegration test to 
evaluate the potential for shifts in the current structure or its probable persistence, which a 
strong cointegration relation would favor. Moreover, it would be interesting to see how 
strongly commodities related to the indicator in the past, especially at times when the pass-
through was significantly more active and how consistent we are with the macroeconomic 
literature. It would be especially important if we are to fruitfully exploit the current 
correlation structure while being prepared for a correlation-regime change. 
Using the cointegration framework developed by (Granger & Newbold, 1974), we 
explore the possibility of a spurious regression by testing for cointegration using the 
(Johansen, 1988) test after having performed an integration test using (Said & Dickey, 1984). 
Since there are multiple possible structural breakpoints in the correlation structure, we will 
perform the test using several timeframes as before. Firstly by testing over the entire sample, 
then on several sub-samples which represent our areas of interest. The choice of those 
breakpoints is derived from the pass-through literature, not by an endogenous selection like 
(Andrews, 1993). We thus broke-up the period in the following manner: A first sample-period 
comprising the seventies and the eighties which were characterized by a high pass-through 
regime. A second one ranging from the nineties to the present day representing the low pass-
through era and a final sample-period including only the last decade which corresponds to the 
extreme correlation and high volatility period previously identified. 
In order to check for long-term trends which would uphold the case for long-term 
stability, we check the validity of a cointegration hypothesis using a Johansen test. We first 
check for evidence of integration in our time series using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test on the level and first difference of our time-series, the results of which are 
exhibited in Table 2. The first and most unsurprising conclusion we have is that can we reject 
the null hypothesis (ܫሺ0ሻ) for both our time series in level and at any period in time. Our 
result is statistically significant at the 1% level. The second conclusion we can reach is that 
can we accept the null hypothesis (ܫሺ0ሻ) for the first difference of both our time series and at 
any period in time. Our result is also statistically significant at the 1% level, which then leads 
us to conclude that the process driving our two time series in level is of order exactly 1 (ܫሺ1ሻ). 
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Table 2: ADF tests for unit root 
 
 We can therefore perform the regression analysis and test for spurious regressions using 
the Johansen Test as is presented in Table 3. As expected, the regression analysis yields a low 
Adjusted R² for the overall period studied and for the 1970-1995 period. However, it gives a 
higher Adjusted R² for the 1995-2010 and the 2000-2010 period. The last of the two periods’ 
Range Test option AR(1) estimate AR(1) estimate
1970‐2010 No deterministic part 0.013 *** 1.000 ‐0.120 *** 0.998
Constant term ‐1.836 *** 0.960 ‐1.061 *** 0.977
Constant plus time‐trend ‐2.064 *** 0.945 ‐2.953 *** 0.839
1970‐1995 No deterministic part ‐0.549 *** 1.000 0.741 *** 1.012
Constant term ‐0.864 *** 0.977 ‐0.262 *** 0.994
Constant plus time‐trend ‐2.435 *** 0.916 ‐2.056 *** 0.899
1995‐2010 No deterministic part ‐5.529 *** 1.001 ‐0.235 *** 0.993
Constant term ‐5.639 *** 0.896 ‐1.377 *** 0.888
Constant plus time‐trend ‐5.601 *** 0.562 ‐2.554 *** 0.382
2000‐2010 No deterministic part ‐4.556 *** 1.001 ‐0.667 *** 0.966
Constant term ‐4.641 *** 0.643 ‐2.061 *** 0.617
Constant plus time‐trend ‐4.578 *** 0.157 ‐0.778 *** 0.446
Range Test option AR(1) estimate AR(1) estimate
1970‐2010 No deterministic part ‐7.586 ‐0.106 ‐8.036 0.040
Constant term ‐7.587 ‐0.111 ‐8.059 0.032
Constant plus time‐trend ‐7.570 ‐0.113 ‐8.033 0.032
1970‐1995 No deterministic part ‐4.550 0.253 ‐4.651 0.087
Constant term ‐4.525 0.253 ‐5.148 ‐0.092
Constant plus time‐trend ‐4.923 0.136 ‐5.148 ‐0.113
1995‐2010 No deterministic part ‐5.529 ‐0.441 ‐4.845 0.048
Constant term ‐5.639 ‐0.494 ‐4.817 0.044
Constant plus time‐trend ‐5.601 ‐0.499 ‐4.822 0.027
2000‐2010 No deterministic part ‐4.556 ‐0.495 ‐4.035 0.000
Constant term ‐4.641 ‐0.558 ‐3.980 ‐0.001
Constant plus time‐trend ‐4.578 ‐0.559 ‐4.000 * ‐0.034
Note :  */**/*** denotes the significance at the 10%/5%/1% level
TS
Variable: Δ I_CH Δ GSCI_TR
ADF t‐statistic ADF t‐statistic
DS
Variable:
ADF t‐statistic ADF t‐statistic
I_CH GSCI_TR
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R² is slightly smaller (contrary to our correlation analysis) partly because of the adjustment of 
the R² to the sample size (which is smaller in the second case). All the regressions are 
significant to the 99% threshold except for the first one (over the entire 1970-2010 period). 
Table 3: Long-run equilibrium and cointegration test results 
 
As expected, the cointegration hypothesis is strongly upheld according to our Johansen 
Test for the 2000-2010 period while it is strongly rejected for the entire sample period. More 
precisely, we can reject the cointegration hypothesis for the 1970-2010 period at the 95% 
level, and we can uphold the hypothesis for the 2000-2010 period at the same level. For both 
the 1970-1995 and 1995-2010 period, we have weak evidence of cointegration (significant 
only at the 90% level). We can therefore conclude firstly that according to our study, the 
cointegration seems to have begun in the early 2000s and is still holding today and that 
secondly, we have experienced significant regime change over that forty year period. It is 
consistent with the literature on the macroeconomic model. We should therefore expect our 
strategic allocation strategy to perform better in a historic backtest for the 2000-2010 
timeframe and less so before that. Inversely, we should expect our tactical allocation to 
outperform in the preceding period and underperform in the more recent period as we will 
see. 
Dependent Variable:
Range:
#Observations: 163 100 63 43
Independent Variables
Constant 1.024 1.041 0.967 0.971
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
GSCI_TR (x10^6) ‐1.907 ‐14.764 9.784 9.224
(x10^6) (0.956) (3.069) (0.740) (1.116)
Adj. R² 2.41% 19.10% 73.83% 61.91%
Fisher 3.981 ++ 23.136 +++ 174.875 +++ 68.267 +++
p‐value 0.048 5.5E‐06 1.1E‐19 2.4E‐10
Note :  +/++/+++ denotes the significance at the 90%/95%/99% level 
Johansen Test for constant plus time‐trend:
Statistic Null
Trace r< = 0 20.702 ** 8.863 10.494 10.908
r< = 1 2.645 3.460 * 3.458 * 5.218 **
Eigen r< = 0 18.057 ** 5.403 7.035 5.690
r< = 1 2.645 3.460 * 3.458 * 5.218 **
Core Headline Inflation Indicator
Note :  */**/*** denotes the significance at the 90%/95%/99% level using critical values 
generated using MacKinnon (1994, 1996)
1970‐2010 1970‐1995 1995‐2010 2000‐2010
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3. Empirical estimations of allocation strategies 
3.1. Strategically allocating commodities in inflation hedging portfolios 
Building on the previously mentioned macroeconomic literature on the current absence 
of pass-through into core inflation of commodity price shocks and its asset pricing 
implications in terms of asset correlations we briefly explored in the previous section, we aim 
to formalize the following strategic allocation for commodities: 
We have shown that the spread between HI and CI is highly correlated to commodities 
whereas their correlation to core inflation is negligible. The allocation of commodities in our 
inflation hedged portfolio should accordingly be targeted at hedging this fraction of the 
inflation risk. We therefore built a two fund portfolio with a first allocation intended to hedge 
core inflation, while the second one is aimed at hedging the residual inflation spread. If 
commodities proved to be a natural investment to hedge the inflation spread, finding a core 
inflation hedging asset will be more arduous for two reasons: firstly, there is no asset as of 
today with cash flows linked to core inflation and secondly, core inflation is an economic 
concept which is very poorly correlated to any tradable security. However, since core inflation 
displays very low volatility on short to medium horizons, we could envisage a partially 
unhedged strategy in which we would remain at risk on the core inflation part as forecasts 
should not be too far off the ex-post realized value because of the low volatility. 
We then define the following long-only strategy in which we secure with a nominal 
bond investment the expected core-inflated value of our investment while remaining at risk on 
the unexpected core inflation –defined as the difference between ex-post realized and ex-ante 
forecast– and playing the natural cross-hedging of commodities with the inflation spread to 
hedge it. We should therefore achieve an extreme event hedging of headline inflation while 
benefiting from the real rate premium derived from the nominal bond investment. 
To perform the backtesting of our proposed strategic allocation we used fixed-income 
and commodity data obtained from Bloomberg. Inflation data were retrieved from the FRED 
database. We use forecasted core inflation data either obtained from the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF) when it is available or computed using a very conservative 
hypothesis of stability in level and a term-structure shaped by the headline forward curve 
when it is not. We use only information available at the time of the investment to avoid 
“back-trading” or data mining biases. This dataset is available only from 1990 onward, thus 
impeding us from running a backtesting exercise on the previously identified high-pass-
through era. 
The zero coupon bond whose maturity matches our target investment one is allocated 
such that its terminal value equals the expected core-inflated value of our portfolio. Let CI be 
the forecasted core inflation and ߬଴,௧௓஼ே be the zero coupon nominal rate, we can therefore write 
the fixed income allocation as: 
ܨܫ଴,௧ ൌ ቆ1 ൅ ܥܫ଴,௧1 ൅ ߬଴,௧௓஼ேቇ
௧
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The residual part of our investment is allocated in commodities and we will assume its 
performance is equal to that of the GSCI_TR total return index.  
 
Table 4: A commodity enhanced bond portfolio vs. a linker benchmark: 
 
We will define the benchmark against which we will test our strategy as a pure 
investment in linkers with a maturity matching that of the investment horizon. The return of 
the benchmark is therefore equal to the real rate defined at inception plus the accrued headline 
inflation over the life of the linker and floored at zero to respect TIPS characteristics. Real 
rates are defined as the difference between the US nominal zero coupon sovereign rate and the 
breakeven inflation of matching duration. The performance of the strategy compared to its 
benchmark is presented in Table 3. The Information Ratio (IR) is defined here as the mean of 
each of the excess returns of our alternative strategy compared to its benchmark divided by 
the tracking error at each starting point in the sample period. The performances for two target 
maturities are represented as an illustration in Figure 4. Points are dated at inception. 
For maturities above three years, our alternative strategy consistently beats its 
benchmark in terms of IR and mean absolute return for both time periods studied here, albeit 
with higher volatility. The strategy’s performance increases with maturity except at the four 
year horizon, though the difference with the three year is clearly not statistically significant. 
The underperformance compared to the benchmark in the 2000-2010 period for the one and 
two year investment horizon is clearly a result of strongly depressed nominal rates: as real 
rates went negative at times during the height of the crisis it forced our allocation algorithm to 
select a cash-only portfolio, thereby obviously yielding negative real rates. 
Also, contrary to our pass-through hypothesis, the strategy does perform better during 
the 1990-2000 period than in the 2000-2010 period. This slight underperformance in the last 
period is probably explained by several factors: Firstly, the severe underperformance of 
nominal bonds contemporaneously with spiking inflation during the 2008-2009 US financial 
Average 5.18% 4.87% 5.51% 5.26% 5.98% 4.43% 6.59% 5.44% 7.18% 4.94%
Std. 2.20% 2.10% 4.31% 3.34% 5.89% 2.92% 7.72% 5.69% 11.24% 6.13%
IR
Avg. %Com
Std. %Com
Average 3.66% 3.88% 4.05% 4.19% 4.60% 3.80% 5.04% 4.39% 5.64% 4.10%
Std. 1.77% 2.16% 2.98% 2.96% 4.81% 2.08% 8.60% 5.08% 13.00% 6.25%
IR
Avg. %Com
Std. %Com 7.10%
1.34% 3.28% 5.61% 7.99% 10.40%
1.55% 3.02% 4.20% 5.61%
2000‐2010
0.140 0.291 1.394 1.307 1.769
1.88%
1.53%
4.37% 7.06% 9.80% 12.57%
2.89% 3.97% 5.10% 6.18%
1.0590.6150.763‐0.180‐0.145
1990‐2010
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crisis as a result of flight to quality mechanically increased the cash-holding in our alternative 
portfolios as it was required to match a relatively stable core floor. Secondly, rising headline 
inflation boosted the returns on the benchmark portfolio which performed overall fairly well. 
And thirdly, the post-recession commodities forward prices being in strong contango 
generated high roll-yields which put a serious drag on the GSCI-TR’s post-crisis 
performances.  
Figure 4: Out of sample evaluation of the strategic allocation vs. a benchmark linkers portfolio. 
Were such a strategy to be implemented by an asset manager, several fixes could have 
been implemented: Firstly, a roll-cost enhanced index such as the roll-optimized Rogers RICI 
could have been used in place of the GSCI. And secondly, as sovereign real rates went 
negative, relatively well rated corporates’ cash-securities still yielded positive real-rates and 
could have been a better choice for our strategy even if we should have adjusted ex-post the 
performance for the resulting added credit risk. We chose not to go down this path in our 
paper in order to be consistent with the paper on the index used: enhanced indexes are fairly 
recent and certainly don’t go as far back as the seventies like the GSCI does. 
Figure 5: Commodities’ share in the core-driven strategic allocation 
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 Yet, overall, our strategic allocation for commodities derived from the pass-through 
hypothesis seems to be supported by this backtesting exercise though we must point out 
several important caveats: firstly, commodities have enjoyed an exceptional bull-run through 
much of the period studied and it certainly biased upward the returns of our strategy by 
generating abnormal real returns. Secondly, the heredity of the Great Moderation has resulted 
in decreasing inflation and inflation risk premium throughout the period studied, therefore 
making realized unexpected inflation negative on average, thus also boosting our strategy’s 
performance. And thirdly, the absence of available data prior to 1990 impedes the 
computation of the strategy’s performance during a period of higher pass-through which 
would have been interesting for comparison purposes. As the US economy recovers, we can 
expect our alternative strategy to strongly outperform again: there may even be signs of it in 
the very last points of our graphs which seem to show an upward move. Yet, an exceptionally 
strong recovery could also awaken the pass-through, with all the consequences that entails.  
 
3.2. Tactically allocating commodities in inflation hedging portfolios 
The second potential application for the pass-through literature in terms of portfolio 
management we would like to explore in this article is the market-timing power for 
commodities in inflation hedging portfolios of a pass-through indicator: considering our asset 
pricing hypothesis relative to the pass-through cycle, we could envisage using its estimation 
in order to time the cycle by going long on commodities when the gap between the HI and the 
CI widens (increase in the inflation spread) and reduce our exposure to commodities when the 
gap closes as either the pass-through operates or simply the HI is falling as it mean reverts 
towards the CI. We will be using low frequency data as there is too much noise below the 
quarterly frequency to monitor such a slowly evolving macroeconomic variable. The 
specificity of this tactical allocation approach is that we will try to time commodities’ 
contribution to inflation regardless of any maximization of their potential nominal or real 
return. 
 The first assessments of our strategy that we will be conducting consist in an ex-post 
comparison of the optimal commodity allocation in a commodity and cash portfolio versus the 
pass-through indicator. We construct a quarterly rebalanced portfolio made up of both 
GSCI_TR and theoretically risk-free US sovereign three month T-Bills. Its optimal ex-post 
commodity allocation is performed by maximization of the portfolio’s Sharpe ratio. The 
obvious pitfall of this methodology is that we clearly do not want to be running a “back-
trading” exercise but rather capture only low frequency “fundamental” movements as opposed 
to high frequency market timing moves. To achieve this goal, we run the optimization using 
trading cost which penalizes too frequent “opportunistic market-timing trades” while favoring 
long-term trend reallocations. Since those results would still be too volatile to capture the 
phenomena we target, we used both proportional trading costs and non-linear trading costs 
(which evolve with the square of the trade size) following (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986) and 
(Vayanos, 1998). This adjunction enables to obtain a credible allocation in terms of asset 
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resulting tactical allocation is plotted in Figure 8 (light blue continuous line). We benchmark 
it against the 40%-60% commodities-cash allocation (gray dotted line). Since on average our 
tactical allocation is 60%-40% commodities-cash allocated, we also benchmark it on this 
alternative allocation (dark blue dashed line) to control for the extra commodity weight given 
in our tactical allocation. The results from these simulated portfolios are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Quarterly rebalanced out-of-sample tactical evaluation vs. constant weight benchmark portfolio 
 
  
 Whichever time period is considered, the tactically allocated portfolio consistently beats 
both benchmarks. The spread in performance as measured by the IR between our tactical 
allocation and its benchmarks is also greater for the 40% commodity allocation than it is for 
the 60% commodity allocation. The difference is especially large during the 1970-1990 
timespan (78% larger) and small in the 2000-2010 period (25% larger) compared with an 
average of 31% on the entire sample. 
Those out of sample simulation results seem to once again uphold our tactical pass-
through allocation hypothesis in the sense that our alternative portfolio performs better when 
the pass-through is larger and less so when it is not. It is worth noting that in this last timing 
exercise, we did not account for realized trading costs which would inevitably drag down the 
performance of a tactical allocation compared to a strategic allocation which requires less 
frequent therefore less costly portfolio rebalancing. The outcome would most probably still be 
positive in the high pass-through period but the tactical allocation could backfire in the more 
recent period considering the relatively low IR. If the WI indicator does seem to add tactical 
value to a commodity strategy, it should nonetheless be used in conjunction with a battery of 
other indicators and not on a standalone basis to achieve the best possible allocation. 
   
Ptf. Alt. C60% C40% Alt. C60% C40% Alt. C60% C40% Alt. C60% C40%
Mean 2.64% 2.24% 1.96% 3.69% 3.19% 2.78% 1.72% 1.40% 1.24% 1.75% 1.42% 1.17%
Std. (7.50%) (6.30%) (4.23%) (5.35%) (5.23%) (3.49%) (8.89%) (7.04%) (4.69%) (10.57%) (8.04%) (5.33%)
0.080 0.1000.168 0.299 0.100 0.102IR 0.129 0.169
1970‐2010 1970‐1990 1990‐2010 2000‐2010
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Conclusion 
 
 The dramatic macroeconomic shift we have witnessed over the last decade has 
gradually reshaped our understanding of the relationship between macroeconomic variables 
and changes in commodity prices. The academic community has in particular delved into the 
disappearing pass-through of commodity price shocks into core inflation, and the far reaching 
consequences it has in terms of monetary policy conduct, especially so when it comes to 
dealing with surging crude oil prices and headline inflation. While macroeconomists and 
econometricians unraveled the breakdown in the pass-through, little concern was given about 
its consequences in terms of the allocation of commodities into inflation hedging portfolio 
management. This article endeavored to provide a first tentative answer to this question. The 
main take away from this paper can be summed-up in two arguments:  
Firstly, we have established that in terms of asset pricing and as a consequence of the 
disappearance of the pass-through, relative variations in the core inflation index to the 
headline inflation index have been strongly cointegrated with financial commodity prices 
since the early 2000s and less-so before that. It thus opens the way for an alternative inflation 
hedging portfolio technique in which a natural strategic allocation for commodities could be 
defined as they truly are the perfect hedge for the spread between core and headline inflation 
variations. We propose to use forecasted core inflation data to determine ex-ante a strategic 
commodity allocation. Ultimately, the core inflation risk which has been proved to be 
minimal in the current macroeconomic environment should be left unhedged in our alternative 
strategy: as we secure only its expected value at inception with an adequately chosen nominal 
bond or cash allocation, it leave the difference between it ex-ante and ex-post values 
unhedged. Backtestings of this strategy, with all the previously mentioned caveats, have 
proved it to be quite successful. It has even managed to survive the challenges of the last 
crisis fairly well and could be expected to perform even better in an economic recovery 
scenario. 
Secondly, we have shown that attempts at timing the pass-through cycle with a 
backward looking indicator we constructed has yielded an efficient tactical commodity 
allocation rule at times when the headline-to-core inflation pass-through was significant, and 
much less so in the current macroeconomic environment characterized by a muted pass-
through. Since the difference between core and headline inflation indices is a mean-reverting 
process, and that it is also intrinsically linked with commodity prices by construction, we 
hoped to be able to define a dynamic commodity allocation rule according to the current state 
of the pass-through cycle: building an indicator that is a function of the spread between the 
core and the headline inflation would, according to the pass-through theory, indicate how our 
commodity allocation should dynamically evolve. It invites to go long on commodities as it 
goes up and short them when it goes down. Indeed, this indicator has displayed in our back-
testing experiments an ability to generate significant alphas by efficiently driving the 
commodity allocation to match the dynamic of commodities with respect to inflation. 
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The principal issues this paper has either failed to resolve or ignored are the following: 
Firstly, we must mention that as a caveat to this study, the various backtesting exercises we 
ran were significantly positively impacted by what is probably an exceptional coincidence of 
secularly decreasing inflation and inflation risk premium with a historic bull run for 
commodities. One might wonder if the “brave new world” we were ushered into thanks to 
unconventional monetary policies, rapidly growing emerging countries and peak-oil will long 
leave the macroeconomic status quo untouched with a muted pass-through. 
Secondly, one might wonder if hedging this commodity induced spread between our inflation 
references is useful at all: core inflation is on average only marginally different from headline 
inflation for long-term investors, but has experienced significantly lower inflation in the 
macroeconomic environment of the last decade. This changing US macroeconomic landscape 
should theoretically push many long-term liability driven investors towards a swap of 
references from headline to core inflation. Yet, the drive to move liability indexation towards 
core inflation is currently curtailed by the lack of investable core-linked assets and therefore a 
lack of a market reference to enable marking-to-market of such Liability Driven Investments 
(LDIs). The strong potential demand for such securities drove Deutsche Bank to launch the 
first investable core proxy in September 2012 (Li & Zeng, 2012) in the form of a long-short 
linkers-energy commodities index which serves as a reference for trading fixed-for-float 
“core-proxy” inflation swaps. It is thus most probable that we will see CI-linked securities 
issued in the near future if the derivative market for core inflation takes off, as it did for HI-
linked securities decades before. The relative cheapness of issuing CI-linked securities could 
in particular attract cash-strapped sovereign issuers eager to attract new investors and reduce 
their financing cost volatility arising from the headline-indexation. 
This evolution would pave the way for a natural extension of this paper into an arbitrage 
strategy involving long-short core versus headline securities  and cross-replicating commodity 
portfolios. In the meantime, investors wishing to make-up for the lack of an investable core-
linked security could either invest in a nominal bond portfolio and buy a fixed-for-float core 
swap overlay as in (Li & Zeng, 2012), or invest in a linkers portfolio and swap the headline 
inflation for the core inflation as in (Fulli-Lemaire & Palidda, 2012). Using our correlation 
analysis findings, we could hope to arbitrage those derivative trades by building a replicating 
commodity portfolio. It is a complex problem as pricing such instruments would require a 
mark-to-model approach to price any forward core inflation underlier into an incomplete 
market cross-hedging framework as it is currently unarbitrable. 
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